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FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE IN AN
INFORMANT'S TIP
INTRODUCTION

Effective law enforcement in America relies to a significant
extent upon information supplied by informants. Studies conducted in the 1970s indicated that more than half of the
search warrants issued relied, at least partially, on hearsay testimony of unnamed informants.' The majority of those warrants produced evidence of criminal conduct.2 At present,
police routinely receive information from a variety of individuals, among them turncoat criminals, paid police informers,
interested citizens,3 and some who prefer anonymity. Police
reliance on this kind of information presents the American judicial system with a formidable challenge: to define, consistent with the fourth amendment, 4 a standard that proves the
reliability of informant tips.
1. See Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search
for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 703 n.3 (1972). Studies also reveal that
reliance on hearsay is especially significant in drug-related cases. One study revealed
that upwards of eighty percent of all warrants for drug-related searches were founded
on informant reports. See id. See also 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3 at 500 (1978) (likely that a majority of appel-

late decisions involving probable cause are concerned with information obtained from
informants).
2. See Rebell, supra note 1, at 723, Table 5.
3. Many cities encourage citizens to supply information to law enforcement officials
through various "crime line" operations. Typically, citizens are promised anonymity
and a contingent monetary reward if, after observing criminal activity, they dial a tollfree number and report their observations. Some programs provide monetary rewards if
information supplied by a citizen leads to an arrest; other programs provide rewards
only upon conviction. For example, "CrimeLine Anonymous" operates in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. On successive weeknight news programs a local television station airs a
segment which describes a recently committed criminal offense. Viewers are urged to
report any information relating to the crime by dialing an out of state toll-free number.
Calls are received by operators based in California, who also take calls from other cities
running programs similar to the one in Milwaukee. Information received by the operators is then incorporated into written reports which are mailed or phoned in to Milwaukee police. From the program's inception in November 1983 through October 1984,
"CrimeLine Anonymous" has produced several hundred phone calls, six arrests, and
two convictions - mostly drug-related. The program gives citizens a $500 reward if
information leads to conviction. Telephone interview with Allan May, Program Director of "CrimeLine Anonymous" (October 2, 1984). See also Note, Reliability of Confidential and Anonymous Informants, 12 N.M.L. REV. 517 (1982).
4. The fourth amendment provides:
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Beginning with the United States Supreme Court's 1964
decision in Aguilar v. Texas,5 as "further explicated" five years
later in Spinelli v. United States,6 informant tips have been
measured against a two-pronged test. The purpose of the test
is to ensure that police conduct searches and arrests based
upon trustworthy information.7 To this end, the first prong of
the test inquires whether there are facts or circumstances indicating the informant's basis for concluding that criminal conduct is occurring or that contraband is where the informant
claims it is (the "basis of knowledge" prong). This first prong
is most frequently satisfied by a statement that the informant
personally observed criminal activity. 8 The second prong requires the police officer-affiant to inform the magistrate of the
officer's basis for believing that the informant is credible (the
"veracity" prong). The veracity prong will be satisfied if the
informant previously supplied accurate information to the
police. 9
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
7. The Court has stated that the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment applies to arrest as well as search warrants. See Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958). The probable cause standard for search and arrest warrants
also provides a minimum requirement for warrantless searches. See Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969).
8. Justice White explained that this prong may also be satisfied if the informant
comes by information indirectly and if there is a satisfactory explanation of why the
informant's sources are reliable. Additionally, in the absence of a statement detailing
the manner in which the information was gathered, an affidavit describing criminal activity in detail might make a tip "self-verifying." In this case, "[t]he informant is relying on something more substantial than casual rumor or an individual's general
reputation." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2347 n.20 (1983) (White, J., concurring)
(citing Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416).
9. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967). The prong may also be
satisfied by proof that the informant gave information against the informant's penal
interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion).
The credibility prong is sometimes described as having two "spurs," allowing the government to establish "either the general credibility of the informant or the reliability of
the particular piece of information related." See Note, Use of Hearsayto Establish Probable Cause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 177, 178 (1983). Justice Rehnquist also identified these
"spurs" in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2333 (1983). This bifurcation, however,
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As one commentator noted, the Aguilar-Spinelli framework provoked "apparently ceaseless litigation." 1 Many
courts became hung up along the guidelines of the twopronged standard. If, in the opinion of a magistrate or reviewing court, a warrant application " 'reeked' of probable
cause, '"11 it might be upheld absent satisfaction of one or the
other of the Aguilar prongs.12 Some warrants were upheld by13
various methods of inferring satisfaction of the test,
although courts differed significantly as to the proper inferences to be drawn. 14 Conversely, strict fidelity to the Aguilar
standard brought about hypertechnical applications in some
produces nothing but confusion and should be disregarded. Insofar as one "spur" considers the piece of information related, .it moves beyond the central inquiry of the credibility prong. The credibility prong focuses on the particular informant - not the
information - to determine whether the informant is likely to be telling the truth. The
basis of knowledge prong then focuses on the information the informant transmits.
10. 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.04 (2d ed. rev. 1984).
11. In an article written by the attorneys for Lance and Susan Gates, defendants in
Illinois v. Gates, Justice William Rehnquist is quoted from a speech he delivered before
the Washington Trial Lawyer's Conference. Justice Rehnquist observed:
I think it can fairly be said that each of the two times the Justices of our Court
came off the bench after hearing the [Gates] case argued, a majority of us felt
that the facts simply 'reeked' of probable cause. . . . [I]f there were previous
decisions of our Court that would have prevented a finding of probable cause in
this case, it was very likely those decision were incorrect.
Reilley, Witlin & Curran, Illinois v. Gates: Probable Cause Redefined?, 17 J. MAR. L.
REV. 335, 376 n.291 (1984). Lax application of the two-pronged test was often justified
by judicial deference to decisions of magistrates. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2231 (1983) ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review."). Unspoken
rationalizations no doubt included the desire to uphold warrants which in fact produced
incriminating evidence. There may also have existed a feeling that the test simply was
not an effective indicator of probable cause. One study conducted in 1969-1970 concluded that warrants that arguably did not meet the two-pronged test did not lead to a
higher proportion of fruitless searches than those that clearly met the Aguilar-Spinelli
standard. See Rebell, supra note 1, at 711-12.
12. See, e.g., State v. Guy, 55 Wis. 2d 83, 197 N.W.2d 774 (1972); Molina v. State,
53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874 (probable cause found with no evidence supporting
basis of knowledge), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion) (veracity may be inferred from declaration against penal interest); State v. Paszek,
50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971) (citizen-informants are presumptively credible).
14. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.3(e) and (f) (citing cases drawing different
inferences from detail and police corroboration).
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cases. 15 These decisions inevitably produced confusion over
the meaning and purpose of the two-pronged framework.
With this troubled past in mind, the United States
Supreme Court ostensibly "abandoned" the two-pronged test
in Illinois v. Gates, 16 a 1983 decision. In its place, the Court
adopted a "totality of circumstances" analysis. 17 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion conceded that an informant's
veracity and basis of knowledge remain "highly relevant in
determining the value of [the informant's] report."' 8 Still, significantly, the Court did "not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case
"19

The Gates decision makes no attempt to provide a technical definition of the totality of circumstances. The focus of the
decision instead reaffirms the importance of common sense
and practicality in probable cause assessments. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for .. conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed.2"
The purpose of this Comment is to propose an acceptable
method of analyzing an informant's tip to determine probable
cause under the totality of circumstances. A thorough understanding of Illinois v. Gates is of course essential to this purpose; therefore Gates will be taken up again in part II. Part III
presents a case study of informant tips in state courts, based
on Wisconsin law. Initially, however, it is critical to under15. See Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330 n.9 (1983) (citing examples of highly technical
applications of the two-pronged test).
16. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
17. Id. at 2332.
18. Id. at 2327.

19. Id. at 2327-38.
20. Id. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
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stand some historical principles upon which analysis of informant tips must begin.
I.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE TwO-PRONG TEST

A.

Pre-Aguilar

Nathanson v. United States 21 is frequently cited for establishing the "ground floor" for any probable cause analysis.
The 1933 Nathanson decision created an absolute prohibition
against the issuance of warrants based solely on the conclusory statements of police. In Nathanson, the officer-affiant
swore that he had "cause to suspect and [did] believe" that the
suspect was engaged in criminal conduct. 22 The Court held
that a warrant should not have issued since "[m]ere affirmance of suspicion of belief is not enough" to establish probable
cause. 23 The officer-affiant was required to set out "facts or
circumstances" which justified his conclusion. 24 The case
stands for the proposition that if a magistrate is to be something more than a rubber stamp for police suspicions, a warrant will not issue unless there is some basis upon which the
magistrate may make an independent judgment regarding
probable cause.
In the informant tip context, the Nathanson decision
raised two fundamental questions. First, how much information does a magistrate require? Second, can a reasonable magistrate give any credit to information which is not a product of
the affiant's direct knowledge, but is based upon hearsay

21. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
22. Id. at 44.
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id.
25. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that magistrates cannot abdicate to
police their constitutional function of determining probable cause. The often cited rationale is attributable to Mr. Justice Jackson:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). See also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1931).
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statements provided by another person?26 Partial answers to
these questions were provided twenty-six years later in Draper
v. UnitedStates. 7 In Draper,a paid police informant who had
proven to be reliable and accurate in the past told a federal
narcotics agent stationed in Denver that Draper was peddling
drugs in that city. The informant provided a physical description of Draper and told the agent that Draper would arrive in
Denver on one of two days; that he would arrive by train from
Chicago; that he would be wearing a light-colored raincoat,
brown slacks, and black shoes; that he would be carrying a tan
zipper bag; and that he habitually "walked real fast." A person precisely matching the description provided by the informant did alight from an incoming Chicago train, agents
arrested him, and incident to the arrest a search revealed two
envelopes of heroin.28
The Draper Court determined first that hearsay, in the
form of the tip, was properly considered by the federal agent
in assessing whether he had probable cause to arrest the defendant.2 9 The Court also determined that the information
given to the federal agent was sufficient to show probable
cause to believe that Draper had violated or was violating the
26. Justice Douglas indicated in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 121
(1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asterisked material), that he might exclude hearsay
from warrant proceedings altogether. This view has commanded little support among
Supreme Court Justices, as it gives no weight at all to the legitimate law enforcement
interests served by informant tips. The view also indicates a good measure of suspicion
that police use hearsay to promote an overzealous pursuit of criminals. "[U]nless the
constitutional standard of 'probable cause' is defined in meticulous ways, the discretion
of police and of magistrates alike will become absolute." Id. at 117 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
27. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
28. Various exceptions to the warrant requirement exist, one of which is when a
search is incident to a lawful arrest. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964).
29. Draper, 358 U.S. at 311-12. The Court rejected the contention that hearsay
cannot be used in probable cause determinations because the evidence is not competent
at trial to prove defendant's guilt. The argument
goes much too far in confusing and disregarding the difference between what is
required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable
cause for arrest or search. . . . There is a large difference between the two
things to be proved . . . and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes
of proof required to establish them.
Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949) (emphasis in
original)).
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narcotic laws. 3 0 The Court considered that the informant had
proved to be accurate and reliable in the past and that the
federal agent had personally verified every fact supplied by the
informant. The agent therefore had probable cause to believe
that the remaining unverified portion of the tip - that Draper
would have the heroin with him - was likewise true.3 ' The
Court concluded:
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. . . . Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being
committed. 2
The Draperdecision has proven to be a critical and controversial decision in the informant tip area for several reasons.
First, the language quoted in the above paragraph is frequently employed to justify a low standard for establishing
probable cause, although its appeal to practicality and reasonableness is unremarkable. 3 Probable cause is plainly a matter
of probabilities and reasonableness; the issue is how to define
these terms. Second, the case is recognized for establishing a
role for informant tips in a probable cause assessment. However, because the Draper decision involved a warrantless
search, it was not until the following year in Jones v. United
States 34 that the Supreme Court explicitly held that hearsay
may be the basis for a search warrant. 35 Finally, the decision
30.
31.
32.
33.

358 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
The Supreme Court's reliance on the Draperdecision varies in accord with the

current philosophical bent of the justices. The Aguilar and Spinelli decisions, products
of the Warren Court, mandated strict scrutiny in probable cause determinations. The
Aguilar Court ignored the Draperdecision, and the Spinelli Court virtually limited it to
its facts. In contrast, the Gates decision, a product of the Burger Court's more permissive view of probable cause, relied heavily on Draper. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2334 (1983).
34. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
35. See id. at 269. The Jones opinion also made it clear that the standard for establishing probable cause in warrantless searches must be higher than that required for a
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was the first to consider the value of hearsay information corroborated by police. The implication from the Draper decision is that if a tip is sufficiently detailed and the detail is
corroborated, the tip may be inherently reliable or "self-verifying."'36 Yet this formulation was problematic in that the
Draper opinion never defined the amount and kind of detail
which, if corroborated, can make a tip self-verifying.
The Supreme Court offered some guidance, albeit imprecise, on the issue of police corroboration in a 1960 decision,
Jones v. United States.37 The Court reviewed an affidavit in
support of a search warrant which contained a tip supplied by
an informant who had given correct information in the past.
The informant said that he had personally visited the defendants' apartment and had purchased drugs from them there.
He also described where the drugs were hidden in the apartment. In support of the tip, the affidavit further stated that
the same information had been given by "other sources" and
that the defendants were known users of narcotics. 38 A warrant to search the defendant's apartment was issued. In upholding the magistrate's decision, the Court held that hearsay
may be the basis of a search warrant "so long39as a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.
The "substantial basis" for crediting the Jones tip was
predicated on three factors. 40 First, the informant had previously given accurate information. Similar informant "track
record" statements by the affiant are assumed to be truthful, 41
search pursuant to a warrant. If it is easier to establish probable cause for warrantless
searches, "warrants could seldom legitimatize police conduct, and resort to them would
ultimately be discouraged." Id. at 270. A prior case had also stated that if the probable
cause standard for searches with and without a warrant were the same, the fourth
amendment would be reduced to a nullity. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948).
36. The Draper decision only implied that a tip may be self-verifying. More recent
Supreme Court cases have stated the matter explicitly. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2327 n.3 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1969) (White, J.,
concurring).
37. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
38. Id. at 268-69.
39. Id. at 269.
40. Id. at 271.
41. The assumption that a "track record" recitation is truthful and should be persuasive is not altogether justified. The affiant could misrepresent a connection with the
informer or knowledge of the informer's reliability. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 312 n.2 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); State ex reL Furlong v. Waukesha Cty.
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and cases before and after Jones indicate that courts readily
infer present veracity from truthfulness in the past.4 2 Second,

the story was corroborated by "other [unnamed] sources" of
information. 43 The Court concluded that "[c]orroboration
• . .reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,"
oddly crediting this bit of hearsay without any proof that cor-

roboration actually occurred. 44 Finally, the defendant was
known by the police to be a user of narcotics. The Court
stated, "[t]hat petitioner was a known user of narcotics made
the charge against him much less subject to skepticism than
would be such a charge against one without such a history."4 5
A few years after the Jones decision, the Supreme Court reversed itself and determined that a magistrate could not con-

sider a suspect's prior reputation in a probable cause
assessment.46 Subsequently, the Court returned to the Jones
position.4 7
Taken together, the Draperand Jones decisions established

relatively permissive guidelines for magistrates and reviewing
courts in the informant tip area. The Jones substantial basis
standard gave magistrates a great deal of discretion, and their
decisions were unlikely to be overturned given deferential

standards of review. In addition, under the Draper standard
even the most questionable tip might establish probable cause
if it was corroborated to some (undetermined) extent.
Ct., 47 Wis. 2d 515, 177 N.W.2d 333 (1970) (officer lied about informant's past reliability). Also, a "previously reliable informer" might have given incorrect information on a
substantial number of occasions. See United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 104 (4th
Cir. 1962) ("reliable informant" proven inaccurate on at least one prior occasion). See
also Comment, Informer's Word as the Basisfor Probable Cause in the Federal Courts,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 846-49 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Informer's Word];
Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What ifit's False?, 19
UCLA L. REV. 96, 134-36 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Search Warrant].
42. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
43. Jones, 362 U.S. at 271.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 271-72.
46. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969).
47. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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B.

Aguilar and Spinelli

Aguilar v. Texas48 might be viewed as a synthesis of the
Jones and Draper decisions.4 9 To some degree, this is accurate. The two-pronged test established in Aguilar,50 requiring
that a police officer-affiant set forth the basis of the informant's knowledge and the reasons for the affiant's belief that the
informant is credible, reflects elements that were present in
the prior decisions. In both cases, the past reliability of the
informant was a factor in crediting the tip,51 and the Jones
decision was cited in Aguilar as having met both prongs. 2
Despite the similarities, however, the Aguilar decision represents a clean break from the more discretionary approach to
informant tips adopted in the Court's prior decisions. The
case is striking because the Draper decision is not cited in the
opinion 53 and the Jones "substantial basis" test does not enter
into the Court's analysis. The new standard was intended to
narrow the field of magistrate discretion, regulate police practices, and emphasize the private values secured by the fourth
amendment over the public interest in law enforcement. 4
The Aguilar decision, unlike prior cases, established a standard for state as well as federal courts - a fact which likely
prompted the court to create more precise guidelines. 5
48. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
49. See Comment, Informer's Word, supra note 41, at 843.
50. The two-pronged test was not so labeled until Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 412-13 (1969). The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates questioned whether
Aguilar comtemplated the creation of any kind of test at all. The Court suggested that
Aguilar merely created "guides" to magistrate determinations of probable cause. See
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 n.6 (1983).
51. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 271.
52. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 n.5. The majority opinion in Draperdid not analyze the informant's basis of knowledge, which was not disclosed. Justice Douglas' dissent noted this deficiency. See Draper, 358 U.S. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
53. Some of the Draperlanguage is adopted by the dissent, however. See Aguilar,
378 U.S. at 119 (Clark, J. dissenting).
54. Not surprisingly, this shift coincided with a change in the Court's membership.
The authors of the majority opinions in Jones and Draper,Justices Frankfurter and
Whittaker, respectively, both retired prior to the Aguilar decision. Their replacements,
Justices Goldberg and White, played major roles in the Aguilar and Spinelli decisions.
Justice Goldberg wrote the Aguilar decision and Justice White wrote a frequently cited
concurrence in Spinelli, in which he questioned the continued validity of the Jones and
Draper decisions.
55. One year prior to the Aguilar decision, the Court decided Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963), and held that the fourth amendment's proscriptions are enforced against
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In Aguilar, a search warrant was issued based upon an affidavit reciting that "[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe" that narcotics
were being kept for sale on the described premises.16 No additional information was presented to the magistrate. 7 The
Supreme Court held that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. From the outset, the Court established
that "the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be preferred
over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to

make arrests." 58 Citing Nathanson v. United States, 59 the
Court found that the affidavit did not present sufficient facts
or circumstances to permit a magistrate to make an independent, informed decision. The Court looked to Giordenello v.
United States60 for the proposition that an informant's basis of
knowledge must be set forth in the warrant affidavit and suggested that the informant's personal knowledge is necessary to
establish the reliability of the informant's story. As for an informant's credibility, the Aguilar decision established only
that "underlying circumstances" must support it.61 The case
did not say precisely what circumstances would suffice, but
conclusory statements of credibility or reliability were clearly
inadequate.62
the states through the fourteenth amendment, and that the standard of reasonableness is
the same under the fourth and the fourteenth amendments. See id. at 23.
56. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108.
57. In fact, police kept the suspect's house under surveillance for about a week
prior to applying for the search warrant, but did not disclose this fact to the magistrate.
The Court stated: "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the
reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention."
Id. at 109 n.1 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
58. 378 U.S. at 110-11 (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1931)).
59. 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
60. 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
61. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
62. The Court has refused to recognize conclusory statements of credibility in the
Aguilar (informant described as "credible"), Spinelli (informant described as "reliable"), and Harris (informant described as "prudent") decisions, among others. While
an averment of the informant's previous reliability will satisfy the credibility prong, see
Aguilar,378 U.S. at 114 n.5 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 257), the Court has held that such
an averment is not necessary to satisfy the credibility requirement. See United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1971) (plurality opinion). The Harris Court questioned
whether an informant's past reliability has anything to do with whether the present
information is truthful. See id. at 582. This objection, in addition to the possibility that
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State courts implemented Aguilar's minimum standards
with a measure of confusion. An immediate and significant
problem was determining whether the Aguilar decision in fact
created a two-pronged test.63 Some of the confusion can be
traced to United States v. Ventresca,64 an informant tip case
decided one year after Aguilar. The Court in Ventresca did
not methodically apply the Aguilar standard to the facts, but
instead seemed to combine the Aguilar prongs by asking
whether there were underlying circumstances for "crediting
the source of the information. ' 65 In addition, certain dicta in
Ventresca indicates that perhaps the Court did not intend to
create any rigid rules in Aguilar. The Court in Ventresca said:
[T]he Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the
teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such
as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by
magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst
and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common
law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants
police may misrepresent an informant's "track record," has prompted the suggestion
that corroboration plays a major role in strengthening the case for an informant's credibility. See Comment, Informer's Word, supra note 41, at 847. The Harris Court found
that the informant was credible on the basis of several factors, including the informant's
declaration against penal interest (which may independently support credibility), the
suspect's prior reputation, and corroboration of the informant's report by "all types of
persons." See Harris, 403 U.S. at 581-82. See also Note, Sufficiency of Showing Probable Cause, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 692 n.35 (1972) (suggesting that information
may come from "non-credible" person if affiant has independent verification of the
information).
63. See supra note 50.
64. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
65. 380 U.S. at 108-09. The Ventresca affidavit described different occasions when
a car was driven to the rear of respondent's house with loads of sugar or empty tins.
Federal investigators then observed five-gallon cans, apparently full, being loaded into
the car. The affidavit further stated that the investigators smelled fermented mash as
they walked in front of the house and heard the sound of a motor pump and metallic
noises coming from the house. The commissioner issued a warrant based on this information, pursuant to which a still was discovered, even though other parts of the affidavit contained uncorroborated hearsay. Id. at 103-04.
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will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their
evidence to a judicial officer before acting.66
The Burger Court67later employed this language to topple the
two-pronged test.
In addition to confusing precedent, lower courts were left
without guidance on a matter brought out in an Aguilar footnote, suggesting that police surveillance might legitimize an
otherwise inadequate tip.68 Some courts, including the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Spinelli v. United States,6 9 com-

bined this "loophole" with the holding in Draperto conclude
that a tip need not explicitly satisfy the two-pronged test if it is
corroborated. 7° After losing in the court of appeals, the government took Spinelli to the Supreme Court, which undertook
a clarification of the role of corroboration in the two-pronged
standard.
In Spinelli, a search warrant was issued based on several
factors. 7 1 First, there was a tip from a "confidential, reliable
informant" that William Spinelli was operating a handbook
from telephones with the numbers WY4-0029 and WY4-0136.
Police surveillance later revealed that Spinelli regularly visited
a certain apartment, which contained two telephones with the
numbers WY4-0029 and WY4-0136. The phones were not
registered in Spinelli's name. Second, federal agents had observed a pattern of behavior which showed that at about 11:00
a.m. on successive days, Spinelli traversed a bridge leading
from East St. Louis, Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri. At about
3:45 p.m. on these same days, the agents observed Spinelli's
regular arrival at the Chiefton Manor Apartments and his en66. Id. at 108.
67. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 (1983).
68. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109 n. 1. The Court stated:
The fact that the police may have kept petitioner's house under surveillance is
thus completely irrelevant in this case, for, in applying for the warrant, the police did not mention any surveillance . . . . If the fact and results of such a
surveillance had been appropriately presented to the magistrate, this would, of
course, present an entirely different case.

Id.
69. 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Eighth Circuit

concluded, "[a]s other facts and circumstances were presented to the Commissioner in
the case before us, we believe it presents 'an entirely different case' and is not controlled
by Aguilar." Id. at 883. See also Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
70. See 393 U.S. at 417.
71. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413-14.
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trance into the apartment where the phones were located. Finally, Spinelli was known to local and federal law enforcement
agents as a bookmaker.
The Supreme Court found that Spinelli's travel to and
from the apartment building and his entry into an apartment
containing two separate telephones did not "bespeak gambling
activity," but was "innocent-seeming" conduct. 72 Also, the
Court held that the allegation that Spinelli was known as a
gambler "is but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's
decision. '' 3 In short, the tip itself, and the extent to which it
was corroborated, provided the only significant information in
the warrant application.74
In considering this information, the Court employed a
two-step analysis, looking first to see if the tip alone satisfied
the Aguilar standard. The Court held that the tip satisfied
neither prong of the two-pronged test. The affiant's conclusory statement that his informant was "reliable" did not
establish the informant's veracity, and the affidavit did not
contain a statement detailing the informant's basis of knowledge.75 The second step of the Court's analysis considered
whether the teachings of Draper76 can "cure" a tip that has
been found inadequate under Aguilar.77
The Draper decision suggested that if police corroborated
numerous details contained in a tip, it may reasonably be inferred that an informant is credible and that the informant
gathered information in a reliable way. As to the latter inference, the Spinelli Court ruled that if a tip contains detail comparable to that contained in the Drapertip, "[a] magistrate.
could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his
72. Id. at 414. The Court said there is nothing unusual about an apartment con-

taining two separate telephones. "Many a householder indulges himself in this petty
luxury." Id.

73. Id. (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933)).
74. The Court explicitly rejected the "totality of circumstances" approach taken by

the court of appeals, saying it "paints with too broad a brush." 393 U.S. at 415.
75. See id. at 416.
76. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
77. The Eighth Circuit concluded that police had corroborated a sufficient amount
of detail to establish both credibility and basis of knowledge. 382 F.2d at 882. See also
Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Causefor Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV.

958, 966-68 (1969).
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information in a reliable way."7 8 Given the "meager report"
in Spinelli, the Court refused to draw the inference that the
informant had a proper basis of knowledge and noted that the
tip "could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark
heard at a neighborhood bar."'79 The Spinelli majority also
indicated that police corroboration of the details of a tip could
provide a basis for satisfying the Aguilar standard.80 However, as Justice Brennan has commented, "[t]he Court's opinion is not a model of clarity on this issue since it appears to
suggest that corroboration can satisfy both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs of Aguilar."81 It is now generally
conceded that Justice White's Spinelli concurrence laid down
the proper rule, "that corroboration of certain details in a tip
may be sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the basis of
knowledge, prong of Aguilar.' ' 82 Again, the Spinelli majority
employed the Draperdecision as a benchmark with respect to
the kind of corroboration necessary to satisfy the veracity
prong.83
The Spinelli decision proved to be an unsatisfactory explication of the Aguilar standard. Lower courts did not understand what the Spinelli case stood for,84 primarily due to the
Court's haphazard "reconciliation" of Draper with the twopronged test. The Spinelli decision appeared to create a niche
78.
79.
80.
81.

Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2354 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

82. Id. (citing Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring)). Justice White

stated in Spinelli:
The thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have independent significance
with respect to proof of [another unverified fact]. The argument instead relates
to the reliability of the source: because an informant is right about some things,
he is more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts.
In a concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, Justice White clarified that he did not

say in Spinelli that corroboration could never satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. If
police corroborate what appears to be "inside information," as in Draper "this corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong." Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2349

n.22. Justice White's Spinelli concurrence is also significant for its recognition of the
"tension" between the Draper and Aguilar decisions, and the failure of the Spinelli
Court to reconcile the two cases. White concluded that if the Draper decision were

good law, then the Spinelli warrant should be upheld.
83. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18.
84. See, e.g., State v. Mansfield, 55 Wis. 2d 274, 280, 198 N.W.2d 634, 639 (1972)

(arguing that an informant's personal observation can establish credibility).
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for police corroboration in the Aguilar framework, but questions persisted: Could corroboration satisfy one or both of the
Aguilar prongs? Is the Draper decision a "benchmark" in
terms of the volume or type of detail corroborated? The case
appeared to suggest that only incriminating details created an
inference of reliability, although the line separating an "innocent" from an incriminating detail may be thin indeed. 5 The
Spinelli Court's refusal to consider a suspect's prior reputation also is subject to debate, considering the difference between the matter to be proved at trial and that to be proved in
a warrant application. Furthermore, there is a strong argument that the Court simply reached the wrong outcome in
Spinelli. The Court's refusal to find probable cause resulted
from a narrow interpretation of the Draperdecision, a reading
which essentially limited that case to its facts. s6 It took only
two years for a majority of the Court to begin to dismantle
parts of the narrow, ambiguous holding in Spinelli.
C. United States v. Harris: Heading Toward Totality
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in United States v.
Harris,87 decided in 1971, distinguished the Aguilar and
Spinelli decisions," and overruled a portion of Spinelli. 9 It
also emphasized the need for a commonsense and realistic approach to probable cause and upheld a search warrant by relying more heavily on the Jones "substantial basis" standard
than the two-pronged test." The Harris affidavit contained
four significant elements, from which the informant's basis of
85. The Court ruled that Mr. Spinelli's travel to and from an apartment containing
two phones was "innocent-seeming" conduct. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 414. Some courts
interpreted this to mean that corroboration of "innocent" conduct carried no weight.
See Smith, 358 F.2d at 833 (discussing distinction between innocuous and material details). The Illinois v. Gates decision has since declared that it is irrelevant whether particular details are "innocuous" or "guilty." 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n.13 (1983).
86. See Note, supra note 77, at 964 n.34.
87. 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality opinion).
88. See id. at 577-79.
89. See id. at 579.
90. Compare Rebell, supra note 1, at 703-04 ("Harrisis fundamentally a continuation, rather than a repudiation, of past Supreme Court analyses of probable cause
.
... ) with Note, 85 HARV. L. REv. 53, 53 (1972) (Harrisis "another indication of
the determination of the Supreme Court's changing membership to reverse the trend of
the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions").
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knowledge was sufficiently established.91 The issue was
whether the affidavit sufficiently established the informant's
veracity. Neither Aguilar nor Spinelli had specified how the
veracity prong could be met. However, the Jones decision,
cited with approval in Aguilar,92 indicated that a statement of
the informant's previous reliability might be required. The
Harris Court nixed such a strict requirement, saying, "[t]his
Court in Jones never suggested that an averment of previous
reliability was necessary. '9 3 The Court acknowledged that
the bare statement in the Harris affidavit that the informant
was "prudent" did not establish credibility, but concluded
that "[t]he affidavit in the present case contains an ample factual basis for believing the informant which, when coupled
with an affiant's own knowledge of the respondent's background, afforded a basis upon which a magistrate could reasonably issue a warrant." 94
This analysis permits the informant's credibility to be inferred if there is an "ample factual basis" for believing that the
informant is truthful. The Court's subsequent analysis did not
overrule Aguilar or Spinelli,95 but the shift from the two96
pronged test back to a substantial basis analysis is apparent.
The Court upheld the Harris warrant under the substantial
basis standard and concluded that a substantial basis may be
based on such factors as corroboration of the tip by "other
sources," 97 the defendant's prior reputation,98 and whether the
informant's tip constituted a declaration against penal inter91. The Harris affidavit stated: (1) that Harris had a reputation with the affiant for
over four years as a trafficker of nontaxpaid liquor; (2) that during that time, a local
constable had located a sizable stash of illicit whiskey in a house under Harris' control;
(3) that the affiant received information from a "prudent" person who swore to personal

knowledge of illicit whiskey within the Harris residence, personal purchase of the same
for a period of more than two years, most recently within the past two weeks, and
personal knowledge of Harris' sale of whiskey to others; and (4) that the affiant had also
received information "from all types of persons" regarding Harris' activities. Id. at 57576.
92. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 n.5.
93. Harris,403 U.S. at 581-82.
94. Id. at 579-580 (emphasis added).
95. In separate concurrences, Justices Black and Blackmun advocated overruling

Spinelli, and Justice Black would overrule Aguilar as well. Id. at 585-86.
96. The Court stated: "Aguilar cannot be read as questioning the 'substantial basis'
approach of Jones." Harris, 403 U.S. at 581. The Harris affidavit was then measured
against the Jones affidavit, and a substantial basis was established. Id.

97. Id.
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est.9 9 To be sure, an informant's credibility and basis of
knowledge continued to be central inquiries in informant tip
cases. However, after the Harris decision, at least credibility
could be established by inference from numerous factors on a
more subjective and less formalistic, case-by-case basis. From
here, the Court had little theoretical distance to travel in arriving at its conclusion in Illinois v. Gates.I°°
II.

ILLINOIS V. GATES

Illinois v. Gates presented the Court with a classic dilemma: How can information supplied by an anonymous tipster, whose veracity and basis of knowledge are ipso facto
unknowable, ever satisfy the requirements of the two-pronged
Aguilar test?"' In Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an anonymous handwritten letter. 10 2 The
informant accused the Gateses of dealing drugs and having
drugs in their home and predicted that within the next couple
98. Id. at 583. Only Justices Black and Blackmun joined the Chief Justice in this
portion of the opinion.
99. This portion of the opinion did not command a majority. Id. at 583-84. The
dissent disputed the wisdom of adopting "such a speculative theory," particularly since
the government did not raise the issue. Id. at 594-96.
100. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
101. See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration,and ProbableCause: Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 107
(1982) (suggesting that anonymous informants should be treated as presumptively unreliable); Note, Reliability and the First-Time Informant, I AM. J. CRIM. L. 290 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note, First-Time Informant]; Note, supra note 3, at 517. See also
Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977) (anonymous phone calls not
possessed of even minimal indicia of reliability).
102. The letter read in part as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly
make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are
done in Flordia. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back
after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and
Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance
drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.
Subsequent police investigation and surveillance revealed that the Gateses did live at
the stated address in Bloomingdale; that Lance Gates flew to Florida on May 5; that on
arrival he went to a motel and stayed in a room registered to Susan Gates; and that he
and an unidentified woman left the motel at 7:00 a.m. on May 6 in a car bearing Illinois
license plates, heading northbound on a road frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2325-26.
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of days they would follow a certain routine in obtaining more
10 3
drugs. Police surveillance of the Gateses revealed that most
of the informant's predictions about the dates and manner of
their movements were correct. On the basis of the tip and the
police corroboration of its details, a search warrant for the
Gates' car and residence was issued. The search uncovered
approximately 350 pounds of marijuana and other contraband. The Illinois courts ruled that the warrant was issued
without probable cause. 1°4 The Supreme Court reversed.
A.

Out Goes the Two-Pronged Test

The Court's first order of business in Gates was to abandon
what it termed the "labyrinthine body of judicial refinement"10 5 and "elaborate set of legal rules"' 1 6 surrounding the
two-pronged test. The Aguilar-Spinelli framework, the Court
concluded, was inconsistent with the "central teaching" of
previous cases which defined probable cause as a "practical,
nontechnical conception." 107 Indeed, the Court charged, the
two-pronged test "encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informant's tips" and focused undue attention on "isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other
facts presented to the magistrate."'0 8
Several additional arguments buttressed the majority's
criticism of the two-pronged test. Foremost among these was
the Court's contention that the test "cannot avoid seriously
impeding the task of law enforcement" and that it "poorly
serves 'the most basic function of any government:' 'to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.' "109
According to the Court, the two-pronged test inhibits law enforcement because it leaves virtually no place for anonymous
informants who "frequently contribute to the solution of
103. The dissenters found it significant that Sue Gates drove back to Illinois and

did not fly, as the informant predicted she would. See id. at 2360 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
104. See 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
105.

Id. at 2333.

106. Id. at 2327.
107. Id. at 2328.

108. Id. at 2330.
109. Id. at 2331 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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otherwise 'perfect crimes.' "110 The Court offered two further
justifications for abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli framework.
One argument suggested that police will resort to warrantless
searches if affidavits continue to be measured against the twopronged test."' Another argument favoring the new approach was that "affidavits are normally drafted by nonlawyers" and' are "issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor
judges. 12
B.

In Comes the Totality of Circumstances

The Gates majority chose to abandon the two-pronged test
and, in its place, to "reaffirm the totality of circumstances
analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations." '1 3 The tradition to which the Court referred
harkens back to the "substantial basis" test established in
Jones v. United States' 4 and to broad dicta in two other prior
cases.115 These cases, argued the majority, are the true forebears of the probable cause standard because they recognize
or
that "probable cause is a fluid concept . . .not 'readily,
16
"
rules."
legal
of
set
neat
a
to
reduced
even usefully,
The two most salient features of the totality of circumstances standard are: first, that it is a remarkably subjective
and amorphous test; and second, while the Court ostensibly
"abandoned" ' 17 the two-pronged analysis, an informant's ve'' 8
racity and basis of knowledge remain "highly relevant" 1
under the new standard. The Court in Gates provided a neat
110. Id. at 2332. Justice White's concurrence, see 103 S.Ct. at 2348-49, and Justice
Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, see 103 S.Ct. at 2358, contended that
Aguilar and Spinelli do not bar the use of anonymous tips to establish probable cause.
111. 103 S.Ct. at 2331. But see 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.3 at 139 (Supp.
1984) (arguing this assertion is unpersuasive).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 2330-31. But see id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Aguilar
and Spinelli decisions "help to structure probable cause inquiries and, properly interpreted, may actually help a nonlawyer magistrate in making a probable cause determination."); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.3 at 138 (Supp. 1984) (fact that nonlawyers
draft and issue warrants "cuts in exactly the opposite direction").
113. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
114. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
115. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
116. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2328.
117. Id. at 2332.
118. Id. at 2327.
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summary of its holding, making plain both of the above
points:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .con-

clud[ing]" that probable cause existed." 9
It is clear enough that the Supreme Court intends that an
informant's veracity and basis of knowledge be treated as relevant circumstances "that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question" whether probable cause
exists.'
It now appears that probable cause may exist even
though one or both prongs of the two-pronged test are not
thoroughly set forth because, the Court concluded, "these elements should [not] be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case." ' 2' The Court continued that "a deficiency in one
[prong] may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by
some other indicia of reliability." 12 2 This passage has received
criticism because, for example, it may permit a finding of
probable cause based solely on the predictions of an unquestionably honest citizen despite a lack of evidence supporting
the citizen's basis of knowledge. 23 The Court left untouched
the issue of whether a strong showing on one of the prongs
can make up for a complete absence of evidence on the
other. 24 But the tenor of the Court's opinion suggests that
this is the case, particularly if there are other indicia of relia119. Id. at 2332.
120. Id. at 2328.
121. Id. at 2327-28.
122. Id. at 2329.
123. See id; id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring). See also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note
1, § 3.3 at 137-38 (Supp. 1984) (proposition is "dead wrong"). Moylan, Illinois v. Gates:
What it Did and What it Did Not Do, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 93, 113-14 (1984) (criticizing
rule). Cf. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis.2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971) (requiring additional
"safeguard" to prove reliability of tip supplied by citizen-informer).
124. The court said that a strong showing on one prong will come into play where
evidence on the other prong is not "thoroughly set forth." Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
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bility, such as police corroboration or a suspect's prior
reputation.
III.

THE WISCONSIN APPROACH TO INFORMANT TIPS

Several months after Illinois v. Gates12 5 was handed down,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the validity of the
totality of circumstances standard in State v. Boggess. 126 In
Boggess, the Court applied a totality of circumstances analysis
to permit a warrantless entry into a private home if a reasonable person would have believed there was an immediate need
to render aid. 127 The Boggess decision did not involve a traditional probable cause determination, but instead concerned
the reliability of an anonymous phone call received by a social
worker. The caller related that Mr. Boggess had been, and
possibly was at that time, abusing his children.12 The case is
perhaps distinguishable from the typical probable cause assessment because it involved a warrantless entry in which the
police were not involved, and probable cause was found in the
context of a possible emergency situation. Moreover, the case
involved the emotionally charged issue of child abuse. Still, it
is highly likely that in any future probable cause assessment,
the Wisconsin court will apply the totality test as it was set
1 29
forth in the Gates decision.
The issue in Wisconsin and in all states that have adopted
the totality test 130 concerns the quanta of evidence necessary

125. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
126. 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983).
127. See id. at 451-52, 340 N.W.2d at 522.
128. Id. at 446-47, 340 N.W.2d at 519.
129. The court fully embraced Gates in the context of the Boggess facts and gave no
indication that the totality of circumstances test would be any less welcome in traditional probable cause determinations.
130. Only one state has thus far explicitly rejected the Gates decision under its state
constitution in favor of continued reliance upon the two-pronged test. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). A number of states have explicitly
adopted the Gates decision as a matter of state constitutional law or have upheld
searches based on Gates language. See, e.g., State v. Espinosa-Gamez, 139 Ariz. 415,
678 P.2d 1379 (1984); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983); Jefferson v. United States, 476 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1984); State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 311
S.E.2d 823 (1984); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983); State v. Tisler,
103 II1. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984); State v. Luter, 346 N.W.2d 802 (Iowa 1984);
State v. Walter, 234 Kan. 78, 670 P.2d 1354 (1983); Bemmer v. Commonwealth, 665
S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1984); State v. Manso, 449 So. 2d 480 (La. 1984); Potts v. State, 330
Md. 567, 479 A.2d 1335 (1984); Hanson v. State, 344 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1984); State
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to satisfy the new standard. A review of the law under the
two-pronged test provides some answers.
In 1968, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v.
Beal,1 31 holding that article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin
Constitution1 32 should be governed by the same standards applicable to the federal fourth amendment. Since Aguilar v.
Texas 13 3 established the federal standard for determining
probable cause in informant tip cases, the Beal court adopted
the two-pronged test. Adoption of the Aguilar standard implicitly overruled those portions of prior cases which ruled
that a search warrant based on hearsay could not issue unless
the hearsay informant appeared and swore before the magistrate.1 34 The Beal decision also rectified a forty-five year old
incongruity by holding that the standard for showing probable
cause, which is a lesser burden than proof of guilt, 135 is the
same for both search warrants and criminal complaints.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court took a generally permissive
view toward probable cause under the Aguilar standard. In
fact, several cases reveal a totality of circumstances approach
to probable cause well before the Gates case was decided.1 36 A
number of arguments, most of which have precedent in federal cases, were utilized to permit satisfaction of the twopronged test even in doubtful cases. Thus, the Court inferred
an informant's credibility, when it was not obvious, from the
v. Kelly, - Mont. -, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983); State v. Robish, 214 Neb. 190, 332
N.W.2d 922 (1983); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984); State v.
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983); State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 573, 470 A.2d 676
(1983); Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1983).
131. 40 Wis. 2d 607, 162 N.W.2d 640 (1968).
132. Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is identical to the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. See supra note 4.
133. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
134. The implication can be drawn from the purpose of the two-pronged test,

which is to establish the reliability of information received from confidential or anonymous informants, who are unlikely or unwilling to personally testify. Further, the Beal
decision did not require the identity of the informant to be disclosed. Beal, 40 Wis. 2d
at 614, 162 N.W.2d at 643. Subsequent cases held that if an informant personally testi-

fies before the magistrate, an affidavit in support of probable cause need not set out the
informant's credibility or basis of knowledge. The magistrate can make an independent

judgment as to whether these requirements are met. See State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 389,
265 N.W.2d 298 (1978); Rainey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 189, 246 N.W.2d 529 (1976).

135. See Beal, 40 Wis. 2d at 614, 162 N.W.2d at 643 (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 172 (1949)).

136. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
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fact that the informant personally observed criminal conduct,"'37 provided a declaration against penal interest 138 or was
a citizen-informer. 139 The Court also found that police corroboration of detail contained in a tip1' 4 and a suspect's prior
reputation 14 1 created inferences which favor probable cause.
A.

Informant Credibility

The surest way for law enforcement officials to establish an
informant's credibility is to allege that the informant provided
previously reliable information. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has repeatedly found this to be sufficient.142 Previously
supplied information need not have led to convictions; it' 14is3
enough that the officer-affiant alleges that it was "reliable."
In the absence of an allegation of previous reliability, Wisconsin permits establishment of an informant's credibility by
four other methods. First, a "citizen-informer" is presumed
44
to be credible. The Supreme Court stated in State v. Paszek'
that:
[A]n ordinary citizen who reports a crime which has been
committed in his presence, or that a crime is being or will be
committed, stands on much different ground than a police
informer. He is a witness to criminal activity who acts with
an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his
concern for society or for his own safety. He does not expect
any gain or concession in exchange for his information. An
informer of this type usually would not have more than one
opportunity to supply information to the police, thereby pre137. See, e.g., State v. Mansfield, 55 Wis. 2d 274, 198 N.W.2d 634 (1972).
138. See, e.g., Laster v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 525, 534-35, 211 N.W.2d 13, 21 (1973).
See also Schmidt v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 370, 253 N.W.2d 204 (1977); State ex rel. Bena v.
Crosetto, 73 Wis. 2d 261, 243 N.W.2d 442 (1976).

139. See, e.g., State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971). See also
Note, First-Time Informant, supra note 101, at 289-92.

140. See, e.g., Molina v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874, cert. denied, 407
U.S. 923 (1972).
141. See, e.g., Molina v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 662, 671, 193 N.W.2d 874, 878-79, cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).

142. See, e.g., Ritacca v. Kenosha Cty. Ct., 91 Wis. 2d 72, 79-80, 280 N.W.2d 751,
755 (1979).
143. See id. at 80, 280 N.W.2d at 755.
144. 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971).
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cluding proof of his reliability by pointing to previous accurate information which he has supplied.' 4 5
The ordinary citizen-informer, therefore, is distinguishable
from a confidential police informer, who generally supplies infor some concession or out of revenge
formation in exchange
146
against the subject.
The Paszek decision recognized that although a citizen-informer may be credible, that is, worthy of belief,'47 the person
is still prone to mistake or exaggeration. Therefore, the Paszek court established that there must be some "safeguard" to
ensure the reliability of the information provided by a citizen.148 This safeguard involves an initial inquiry into the citizen-informer's basis of knowledge: How did the person get
the information? Was there an opportunity to hear and see
the matters reported? In addition, the safeguard demands
"verification of some of the details of the information reported, but it need not be to the same degree as required in
evaluating the 'tips' of a police informer."' 14 9 Whether a citizen-informer is a victim or witness to a crime, or has knowledge of a crime through some other source, some amount of
police corroboration is necessary to meet the Aguilar
standard.
A second method of establishing an informant's credibility
is by alleging that the informant provided a declaration
against penal interest. Typically, statements against penal interest are made by informants who purchase contraband from
a seller and subsequently implicate themselves and the seller
by informing police about the transaction. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Laster v. State 5 ' adopted a portion of the
United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in United
145. Id. at 630-31, 184 N.W.2d at 843.
146. Referring to confidential police informers, the court said: "The nature of
these persons and the information which they supply conveys a certain impression of
unreliability .... ." Id. at 630, 184 N.W.2d at 842. See also M. HARNEY & J. CROSS,
THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

40 (2d ed. 1968) (defining the typical confiden-

tial informant); LaFave, ProbableCausefrom Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law
on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2 n.5 (citizen informants deserve a presumption of reliability).
147. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (5th ed. 1979).
148. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d at 631, 184 N.W.2d at 843.
149. Id. at 631-32, 184 N.W.2d at 843.
150. 60 Wis. 2d 525, 211 N.W.2d 13 (1973).

1985]

INFORMANTS TIPS

51
which stated that "[a]dmissions of crime,
States v. Harris1
like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own
indicia of credibility - sufficient at least to support a finding
of probable cause to search. That the informant may be paid
risk and
or promised a 'break' does not eliminate the residual
' 152
opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct."
Magistrates and courts in Wisconsin would do well to note
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Harriscase. 53 Justice Harlan's
concern is that self-implicating statements will grant automatic credibility to an informant, without any assessment of
whether the informant is taking a personal risk by making the
statement. 154 Indeed, in situations in which law enforcement
officials and informants work together closely, an informant's
statements may create no risk of prosecution or other "loss."
This type of declaration should, therefore, be carefully scrutinized before it is relied upon to establish informant credibility.
Third, Wisconsin permits an informant's credibility to be
established if the informant personally observed criminal conduct and police rely on the informant. This proposition was
introduced in State v. Mansfield.155 In Mansfield, police received "reliable information" from two informants that the
defendants were dealing heroin. One of the informants had
seen heroin in the defendant's apartment. The court concluded that Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong was satisfied
because the informant had actually observed criminal conduct. 56 The court then argued, based on several Wisconsin
cases 57 and two United States Supreme Court cases, 15 8 that
an informant's personal observation can also establish the informant's credibility if police rely on the information.

151. 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 583-84.
153. See id. at 594-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154. Justice Harlan argued that if a police informant is promised immunity in exchange for a statement, the declaration does not run counter to the informant's selfinterest so much as it favors it. Justice Harlan also warned that a policy of permitting
declarations against penal interest to establish credibility will "encourage the Government to prefer as informants participants in criminal enterprises rather than ordinary
citizens . . . ." Id. at 595.
155. 55 Wis. 2d 274, 198 N.W.2d 634 (1972).
156. See id. at 279, 198 N.W.2d at 637.
157. The court cited State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971), State
v. Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d 270, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971), and State ex rel Cullen v. Ceci,
45 Wis. 2d 432, 173 N.W.2d 175 (1970).
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This conclusion is surprisingly far off the mark. The
Mansfield court, citing cases which fail to support its position, 159 effectively nullified the credibility prong of the Aguilar
standard. Under this rule, a paid police informant, an underworld figure or even somebody who is known to supply unreliable information is presumed to be credible simply because the
person claims to have witnessed a crime, providing the police
rely on the informant's truthfulness. It is clear that magistrates cannot perform their detached and disinterested function if they are bound by the police department's
determination of an informant's reliability.
As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in a 1948
case:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable

men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
158. The court cited Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 424 (1969) (White, J.,
concurring), and United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
159. Personal observation did not establish credibility in any of the Wisconsin
cases. The Paszek decision held that the informant's personal observation of criminal
conduct established the basis of knowledge prong; but credibility was established on
another ground: the tipster was a "citizen-informer." See Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d at 628-31,
184 N.W.2d at 842-43. In Knudson, the informant's personal observation again established only a basis of knowledge. The informant was credible because she was a "citizen-informer" as well as a victim. See Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d at 275-78, 187 N.W.2d at
324-26. The Cullen case does contain some language supporting the position taken in
Mansfield, see Cullen, 45 Wis. 2d at 445-46, 173 N.W.2d at 180-81, but it is questionable authority. The Court in Cullen did not conduct a complete analysis under the Aguilar standard. The case does not stand for the proposition that an informant's reliability
may be established by personal observation of a crime because the case never discussed
the issue of an informant's reliability. If it had, it could have found reliability based on
the informant's position as "citizen-informer."
The Mansfield court also unjustifiably relied on Justice White's concurrence in
Spinelli. The Court apparently misinterpreted Justice White's point, that the Aguilar
standard requires something more than that the informant be credible; in addition, the
informant's information must be a product of personal observation, rather than rumor.
Justice White's position does not permit observation to establish credibility. Finally, the
Mansfield court's reliance on the Harris decision is simply puzzling. The cited portion
of Harris concerns declarations against penal interest, with no reference at all to
whether an informant's observation may establish credibility. See Harris, 403 U.S. at

583-84. The Mansfield facts do not indicate that the informants made declarations
against their penal interest. Possibly the official reporter miscited the court's reference
to Harris. Justice Harlan's dissent, see 403 U.S. at 593-94, does state that personal
observation may establish credibility, but only in two situations not applicable to
Mansfield.
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that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in
160
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
It is the magistrate's job to determine whether it is reasonable
for police to rely on an informant, not to accept police conclusions on the matter. An informant's personal observation of
criminal conduct, standing alone, does not create reasonable
reliance because it does not establish that an informant is worthy of belief. Because an informant's personal observation of
a crime does not support an inference that the informant is
credible and because the fourth amendment prohibits police
from judging credibility, the Mansfield decision is bad precedent and should be overruled.
Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated on
several occasions that police corroboration of the details contained in a tip may establish an informant's veracity. 16 1 The
court stated in the Boggess decision that "[a]ny deficiency in
the veracity of the caller due to his anonymity was compensated for by both the specific detail contained in the information the caller provided and by the corroboration of portions
' 62
of that information."'
B.

Informant's Basis of Knowledge

Judicial concern with an informant's basis of knowledge
stems from a desire to winnow out tips which "could easily
have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar."' 163 The focus of the inquiry is not whether the
informant is worthy of belief. Instead, attention is directed at
whether the informant was in a position to receive and accurately interpret information relating to the matter reported.
In Wisconsin, a basis of knowledge is sufficiently established if
160. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
161. See State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 457, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524 (1983); State
v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980) (use of corroboration); Molina v.
State, 53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874 (use of corroboration), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923
(1972).
162. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d at 457, 340 N.W.2d at 524. This statement is misleading
in that it suggests that detail alone can establish an informant's veracity. More accurately, it is corroboration of detail that may establish a tipster's veracity. The detail
contained in a tip may establish an informant's basis of knowledge. See infra text accompanying notes 163-70.
163. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
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an informant personally observes criminal conduct 64 or supplies a tip containing detail which allows an inference that the
informant obtained information from personal observation.
This latter principle was not clearly established until the Boggess decision, in which the court stated that "[t]he detail provided indicates that the caller was speaking from personal
knowledge and not merely repeating an idle rumor."'' 65 The
critical details supplied in the Boggess case concerned the
names and descriptions of the persons involved in the criminal
66
act and their location.1
Two Wisconsin cases, indicating that an informant's basis
of knowledge may be established absent a detailed account of
the matter reported or an allegation that the tipster had personally observed a crime, muddle the requirements of the twopronged test. Both cases, Molina v. State167 and State v.
Guy, 61 were decided in 1972 and employed a thinly veiled totality of circumstances approach. The court in Molina apparently inferred a basis of knowledge based upon police
corroboration of details contained in the tip. However, there
is no explicit holding on this point. Probable cause rested on a
series of factors, including the informant's previous record of
reliability and the suspect's record of prior criminal convictions. 69 In State v. Guy, the court essentially ignored the basis of knowledge requirement. 70 These cases reflect the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's confusion regarding proper analysis of facts under the two-pronged test and how facts create
various inferences which may or may not be sufficient to satisfy the Aguilar standard. The cases also reveal a measure of
judicial impatience with the rigid demands of the Aguilar
decision.

164. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 230 N.W.2d 845 (1975).
165. 115 Wis. 2d at 456, 340 N.W.2d at 524.
166. See id.
167. 53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 923 (1972).
168. 55 Wis. 2d 83, 197 N.W.2d 774 (1972).
169. See Molina, 53 Wis. at 673, 193 N.W.2d at 880.
170. See Guy, 55 Wis. 2d at 96, 197 N.W.2d at 781 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
Justice Heffernan also pointed out that police received the informant's tip four or five
years before they acted on it. Thus, Justice Heffernan argued, the tip had no probative
value at the time of the search and should not have been used to justify it. Id.
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IV.

ANALYSIS UNDER THE TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES

It is plain that if probable cause can be established under
the more exacting two-pronged standard, it necessarily is established under the totality test. Assuming that magistrates
and reviewing courts can decipher the United States Supreme
Court's formulation of the two-pronged test, a logical first
step under the totality analysis is to assess probable cause
under the Aguilar standard. The two-pronged test, despite
criticism of its technicality, offers at least a concrete and reliable analytical framework. If reasonable inferences are drawn
from police corroboration, detail contained in a tip, and a suspect's prior reputation, the two-pronged framework can still
be effectively employed under the totality approach. If a warrant application fails to satisfy the Aguilar standard, magistrates may require additional assurances before issuing a
warrant, including: supplemental police investigation, corroboration of more of the details contained in a tip, disclosure of
more facts or that an informant appear personally before the
magistrate. 171
The wisdom of the Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois v.
Gates1 72 is largely dependent upon the action of issuing magistrates. Because they analyze warrant affidavits after incriminating evidence has been produced, reviewing courts are less
likely to define the totality standard with precision, particularly since the recent adoption of the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.17 3 Magistrates must give substance to
171. Justice Harlan stated, "We cannot assume that the ordinary law-abiding citizen has qualms about [appearing before a magistrate]." United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573, 599 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Illinois v.
Gates. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2356 n.6 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (presumably police

have access to their confidential informants, therefore it is reasonable that they disclose
the facts upon which informants based their conclusions).
172. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
173. The Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in two cases

decided during the 1984 term. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). See generally Gammon, The Exclusionary Rule and the 1983-1984 Term, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1984). The parites in the Gates

case were originally ordered to address the additional question whether a good-faith
exception should be created. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (requesting
parties to brief the issue). However, the Court later reversed itself, "with apologies to
all," and decided not to rule on the matter because it had not been argued in the Illinois
courts. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2321-25. In addition, one commentator suggested that
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the totality of circumstances and so should not abandon the
teachings of the two-pronged test. The reasons are several.
First, police, federal agents and magistrates all benefit
from well-defined probable cause requirements in informant
tip cases. Police and federal agents will know, for example,
that they must corroborate a story supplied by a first-time
confidential informant or must allege that the informant gave
a declaration against penal interest in order to establish the
informant's credibility. In addition, magistrates will know
what to look for in a warrant affidavit. Second, common sense
recommends that magistrates require some evidence of an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge. Absent evidence
of this sort, there is a danger that searches will be conducted
pursuant to rumor or at the insistence of unreliable sources.
And third, a practical application of the two-pronged standard will achieve law enforcement objectives as effectively as
the totality of circumstances test, and will lessen the danger of
unjustified intrusions.
The following presents a brief review of the Supreme
Court's formulation of the two-pronged test in light of Illinois
v. Gates.
A.

Basis of Knowledge

An informant's basis of knowledge may be established by a
statement that the informant personally observed criminal activity or, if information was obtained indirectly, by a satisfactory explanation of why the informant's sources were
reliable.' 74 In addition, under Spinelli v. United States175 and
Draperv. United States,176 if an accused's criminal activity is
described in sufficient detail, a magistrate may infer that the
informant obtained the information in a reliable way. In
Gates, the Court concluded that the anonymous letter, standing alone, gave "absolutely no indication of the basis for the
the main reason the Court refused to rule on the good faith issue in Gates was that

Justice Powell is a stickler for procedural protocol. He also suggested that the Court
wanted to give a broader sweep to the good-faith exception by creating it in a case when
no warrant issued. Moylan, supra note 123, at 118. See also infra note 204.

174. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
175.

393 U.S. 410 (1969).

176. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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writer's predictions."' 77 There were no allegations of the informant's personal observation or of reliable secondary
sources. Furthermore, "the character of the details in the
anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding the letter writer's 'basis of knowledge.' ")178
It appears after the Gates decision that the only certain
way that an informant's basis of knowledge may be established is if the informant personally observed criminal conduct or had a reliable secondary source. The Court concluded
that the details contained in the Gates tip, although substantial, intimate, and not easily predicted, did not permit an inference that the informant had access to reliable
information. 79 If a basis of knowledge cannot be inferred
from the numerous details in the Gates tip, the inference is
permissible in few instances indeed. However, the Gates majority was equivocal in its conclusion, and the opinion could
just as easily be read to say that a basis of knowledge was
inferable from the details in the anonymous letter. It is wiser
to interpret Gates in this fashion for it places consideration of
detail in its proper context: as a method of determining the
reliability of the informant's source. If detail is merely a factor in the totality of circumstances, it loses its value as an analytical tool.
B.

An Informant's Veracity

Nothing in the Gates decision abrogates Supreme Court
precedent permitting an informant's veracity to be established
by a declaration against penal interest 80 or a previous "track
record" of reliability.' 8 ' In addition, the decision does not affect the rule that citizen-informers are presumptively credible. 18 2 The Gates Court did, however, consider whether an
177. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2326.
178. Id. at 2336.

179. See id. The Court said that the Gates' travel plans might have been learned
from a talkative neighbor or travel agent. Still, the majority conceded that "[iff the
informant had access to accurate information of this type [travel plans] a magistrate
could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable

information of the Gates' alleged illegal activities." Id. at 2335.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality decision).
181. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967).
182. See, e.g., State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971). See also 1
W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.4.
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informant's veracity may be inferred from the fact that police
corroborate some of the informant's information. Previous
cases had held that this inference could be drawn, provided
that a sufficient amount of corroboration had occurred and
that something
more than innocent details were
83
corroborated.
The Gates Court argued that the police corroboration,
although substantial, "may well not be the type of 'reliability'
or 'veracity' necessary to satisfy some views of the 'veracity
prong' of Spinelli."'84 The majority's position, given the unusual amount of police investigation in Gates, indicates that police corroboration, like the detail contained in a tip, may no
longer claim a meaningful niche in the framework of the twopronged test. However, the Court again equivocated on the
matter, 85 leaving open the possibility that police corroboration of the sort that occurred in Gates may establish an informant's veracity. Moreover, the Gates decision clarified and
broadened the role of police corroboration by pointing out
that even "seemingly innocent activity [can become] suspicious in light of the initial tip."186
C. The "Cross-Over Effect" and a Suspect's Prior
Reputation
The Gates decision created a type of "cross-over effect," in
which a "strong showing" as to one of the Aguilar prongs may
compensate for a "deficiency" on the other. 87 Presumably, if
there is a complete absence of evidence on one of the prongs,
even a strong showing on the other will not rescue the tip.
This is probably the best interpretation of the Gates decision
since the two Aguilar prongs are "analytically severable"' 88 to
the extent that one focuses on the informant as an individual
183. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
184. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
185. The Court granted that "[tihe corroboration of the letter's predictions . . . all

indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant's other assertions also were
true." Id.
186. Id. at 2335 n.13.
187. Id. at 2329. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.

188. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 592 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and the other focuses on the informant's information.1 8 9 Recognition of this fact does not mean that magistrates and courts
should require an abundance of evidence on both prongs, but
it should preclude ignorance of either prong altogether.
"Other indicia of reliability," principally a suspect's prior reputation, may compensate for deficiencies in the two-pronged
test by adding to the reliability of the tip, but should not substitute for satisfaction of one or the other of the prongs.
V.

CONCLUSION

As Justice Brennan suggested in his Gates dissent, "[t]he
Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive reason for
rejecting the Aguilar and Spinelli decisions doubtlessly reflects
impatience with what it perceives to be 'overly technical' rules
governing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment."1 0 Indeed, the Gates Court was primarily concerned
with holding true the balance between individual constitutional rights and claims of governmental authorities, 191 a balance which the Court was certain had swung in favor of
criminal defendants. The Court was not inaccurate in this respect. Hypertechnical applications of and confusion regarding the two-pronged test allowed numerous suspects who were
the subject of legitimate police activity
to slip through the
1 92
cracks in the criminal justice system.
Still, the Gates Court did not dispute the utility of the twopronged test as a means of assessing the reliability of information received from informants. Regarding an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, the Court made it clear that
under the totality of circumstances standard "magistrates remain perfectly free to exact such assurances as they deem necessary."' 193 Moreover, the Court said that the Aguilar prongs
remain "highly relevant"1 94 and suggested that there must be
189. See State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971) (laying down rule

that regardless of citizen-informant's credibility, there must be an additional "safeguard" to prove reliablity of the tip).
190. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2359 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall, J.).
191. See 103 S.Ct. at 2333.
192. See id. at 2330 n.9.
193. Id. at 2333.
194. Id. at 2327.
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some evidence of both an informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge, such that an excess as to one may compensate for
a deficiency as to the other. 195 The Court's respect for the
two-pronged test as an analytical tool indicates that the Gates
decision was directed less at the test itself than at its sometimes unreasonable application in the lower courts.
Although the Aguilar standard lives, the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. Upton, 196 decided about one year after Gates,
pointedly reiterated that the Gates standard prohibits technical dissection of warrants being analyzed under the federal
constitution. The Court stated that the Gates decision did
more than add "a new wrinkle" '1 97 or "merely refine or qualify" the two-pronged test: 98 the Gates Court instead rejected
the Aguilar standard because it tended to produce
hypertechnical applications. 9 9 In Upton, as in Gates, the
Court did not say that the two-pronged test has no place in
probable cause determinations. Therefore, it is likely that law
enforcement officials will turn to the two-pronged test, at least
initially, to give substance to what has been characterized as
the "vague, standardless" totality of circumstances test. °°
Still, the Court believes that the two-pronged test, standing
alone, tends to isolate issues and encourage "an excessively
technical dissection of informants' tips."'20 1
The difficult issue after the Gates and Upton decisions is
whether the Supreme Court lowered the probable cause standard in informant tip cases; that is, should warrants or warrantless searches be valid under the totality of circumstances if
195. See id. at 2329. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
196. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984) (per curiam).
197. Id. at 2087.
198. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated:
It is not clear that the Gates opinion has announced a significant change in the
appropriate Fourth Amendment treatment of applications for search warrants. . . . [W]e conclude that the Gates opinion deals principally with what
corroboration of an informant's tip, not adequate by itself, will be sufficient to
meet probable cause standards.
Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 568, 458 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1983), rev'dper
curiam, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984). The Supreme Court said that the Massachusetts
Supreme Court "misunderstood our decision in Gates." Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2087.
199. See 104 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
200. Note, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1973).
201. Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2088.
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they do not pass muster under the two-pronged test?2 0 2 The
fear among Gates commentators20 3 is that the case indeed lowered the probable cause requirement in the informant tip context, 2° but this fear is as yet unrealized. It can be persuasively
argued that the warrants in both the Gates and Upton cases
satisfied a reasonable interpretation of the two-pronted test regardless of the Court's adoption of the totality standard. 20 5
Moreover, it is likely that a majority of the warrants considered by reviewing courts will be valid under both the Aguilar
and the Gates standards. The Gates decision will have its
most significant impact in the relatively rare cases in which
probable cause is only marginally apparent. It appears that
202. Of the decisions that have adopted the Gates standard, see supra note 130,
none indicate that the two-pronged test was not also satisfied. Several states have indicated that they will not consider the Gates ruling if a warrant can be upheld on the basis
of the Aguilar-Spinellitest. See, e.g., State v. Villiard, - Colo. -, 679 P.2d 593 (1983);
State v. Ross, 194 Conn. 447, 481 A.2d 730 (1984); Commonwealth v. Grzembski, 393
Mass. 516, 471 N.E.2d 1308 (1984).
203. See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.3 (Supp. 1984); Mascolo, Probable
Cause Revisited: Some DisturbingImplicationsEmanatingfrom Illinois v. Gates, 6 W.
N. ENG. L. REv. 331 (1983); Reilley, Witlin & Curran, supra note 11; Note, supra note
200.

204. In theory at least, it is true that a warrant is more readily obtainable in the
first instance under the new standard than under the two-pronged test. And assuming
that a warrant is issued and produces incriminating evidence, defense attorneys face an
uphill battle to exclude the evidence. In the first place, the Gates decision prohibits de
novo review of probable cause determinations. The Court said:
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." . . . Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the
traditional standard of review of an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a "substantial basis for...
conclud[ing]" that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth
Amendment requires no more.
Gates 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,419 (1969) and
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). And second, the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule increases the likelihood that the evidence will be admissible.
See supra note 173.
205. Justice white would have upheld the Gates warrant, but would have done so
under a broad reading of the two-pronged test. He said "with clarification of the rule of
corroborating information, the lower courts are fully able to properly interpret AguilarSpinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid application." 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (White, J.,
concurring). The informant in Upton presented some evidence of her credibility (she
was a former girlfriend of the defendant; further, the affiant had possibly met the informant previously) and basis of knowledge (she had seen the stolen goods). Moreover,
police had corroborated some of the facts reported. See Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2086.
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the Supreme Court chose to abandon, rather than clarify, the
two-pronged test to prevent suppression of evidence in these
doubtful cases.
The informant tip cases give rise to at least one enduring
concept: absent some evidence of an informant's veracity and
basis of knowledge, a tip may give rise to suspicion, but it
arguably does not meet the constitutional threshold of probable cause.2 6 Therefore, magistrates may be advised to require evidence on both Aguilar prongs, but must draw
reasonable inferences from detail, corroboration, and any
other indicia of reliability. If a search warrant is issued absent
this sort of evidence or if a warrantless search is conducted on
similarly tenuous grounds, the difficult fourth amendment issues raised in the Gates case are fully framed. In such a case,
the Gates standard will probably allow the state to use the
fruits of the search against the defendant.20 There is a certain
justice in this: defendants should not escape the implication
of the incriminating evidence they produce. However, states
must be aware that this interpretation of the Gates decision
may authorize newly permissive police and magistrate practices. It is on this front that the Gates battle will be waged.
PETER

F. MULLANEY

206. It is particularly unnerving to some Gates critics that Justice Rehnquist's opinion seemed to blur the distinction between probable cause and "particularized suspicion," the standard necessary to justify a stop and frisk. See Mascolo, supra note 203, at
383, 391 n.390; Moylan, supra note 123, at 113-14; Note, Use of Hearsay, supra note 9,
at 181 n.36. The Court equated probable cause and suspicion on several occasions,
offering stop and frisk cases as precedent. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 441 (1981)); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). See
also Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 ("the term 'probable cause'. . . imports a seizure made
under circumstances which warrant suspicion"); id. at 2335 n.13 ("In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is
'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of
non-criminal acts.").
207. This is a reasonable conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's insistence that
reviewing courts defer to magistrate decisions. See supra note 204. See also Upton, 104
S. Ct. at 2088.

